Dr Liam Fox
I want to begin by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and her incredible team of Ministers, our fabulous negotiating team, our Japan team at DIT and our team in Tokyo, led by ambassador Paul Madden, who have all contributed enormously to the success of this negotiation. I want briefly to explain why I think this deal is important in the global trade environment, what it says about Japan’s outlook and the UK’s outlook and why it matters for CPTPP.
All trade liberalisation matters, particularly at the present time. Even before the covid pandemic, global trade was shrinking—partly for cyclical reasons, 10 years post the financial crisis; partly because of trade tensions, not least between China and the United States; and partly because of rising protectionism, not least in the G20. The G20 represent 90% of global GDP and 80% of global trade. At the end of the financial crisis, only 0.7% of G20 imports were covered by restrictive measures. In the first quarter of 2020, that had mushroomed to 10.3%—a huge barrier for developing countries to have to overcome to be able to sell their goods into developed markets.
We have also had a failure of liberalisation at the WTO—25 years and all we have seen is the trade facilitation agreement, no further liberalisation—and we have seen far too few multilateral agreements. In fact, we have seen none apart from TFA; we are now moving to plurilateral, regional and then bilateral FTAs. That is why any liberalisation should be welcomed in this House.
Japan is a country with a GDP of $4.97 trillion. It has a global GDP share of 4.13%—not an inconsiderable market—with a GDP per capita of over $39,000. Japan is increasingly assertive and confident on the global stage. When TPP was looking as though it might collapse when President Trump pulled the United States out, Prime Minister Abe stepped up and led its recovery. I am sure that everyone in the House would like to wish him good health in his retirement.
We have seen increased co-operation in security between the UK and Japan, with the first joint exercise by UK troops in Japan only last year. We have a strong investment relationship with Japan. A self-confident, assertive Japan is good for our bilateral relations, good for regional security and good for global prosperity. My right hon. Friend said right at the outset what she thought that meant for the UK’s outlook. Clearly, having an independent trade policy is one of the positive consequences of Brexit. This agreement itself says a lot about the UK’s outlook. It brings improvements to mobility provisions for business travellers and it is has clear pluses in terms of data and digital, indicating the UK’s forward-leaning position on this most important element in the global economy and our understanding of the importance of e-commerce, not only as a key enabler of development but as an empowerment tool—not least for women in the global economy, particularly in the least developing economies.
The agreement also helps us to escape from the trap of the EU’s data localisation. The four countries—Germany, France, Slovenia and Austria—that held the rest of the EU to ransom are out of step with the rest of the global economy. They had a medieval view of data localisation, and not only have we escaped it by being out of the European Union, but we have managed to go forward in this agreement. Of course, the real gain that we would get with Japan would be global services liberalisation, because a multilateral agreement, or even an open plurilateral agreement, would give us far greater access to what we really need.
Finally, let me say something about CPTPP. This is a regional grouping of increasing importance. As my right hon. Friend said, it represents an increasing share of global GDP. With the UK, it would be bigger in GDP share than the EU; with the United States, its share would be over 40%. Here is a great opportunity: if we can persuade the new United States Administration to take America back into TPP alongside the UK, it will also have net benefits for our trading relationship with the United States.
Eleven fast-growing countries: a single set of rules of origin, allowing content from all CPTPP countries to be cumulated—but above all else, its advantage lies in the strategic environment. If we want to deal with the problems of China in global trade, in terms of intellectual property theft and transparency, we are going to do it not by hitting it with tariffs repeatedly, but by creating a parallel structure with a widened CPTPP that shows what can be achieved by genuine free trade and adherence to global rules. That is the real prize for us.